Okay! So finally some time to talk about the content at Global Power Shift.
As I have said in previous posts, during the event we have all split into different ‘tracks’. The track I am in is Non-Violent Direct Action (NVDA). One of the great things about NVDA is that to be able to do it effectively you have to be able to have the philosophical discussion about it first. You have to be able to constructively discuss the questions; what is violence, and is violence ever justified?
Yesterday we dove into these questions and I want to pull out a few thoughts bubbling around in my head.
I have to say, starting off, I was slightly disappointed with the level of interaction around the question of ‘what is violence?’. Many seemed to take a really simplistic approach – “it is physically harming others”, or “it is vandalism or the destruction of poverty” were the two key responses. Reverse the question and we were unable to genuinely ask ourselves “what is non-violence?” – the best we could come up with were the ideas that non-violence (in the context of social movements) were ‘peaceful rallies’, ‘sit-ins’ or similar. Coming from this conversation I have really thought in depth about the question of what is violence, and have had two thought bubbles.
Firstly, the major issue I think we missed was that violence only exists in relation to power structures. Power and violence are inherently interlinked – it is those with power who are best able and most willing to inflict violence on our society – whether it is police attacking protesters, or major companies destroying the lands of farmers. As someone in our stream yesterday said (paraphrasing), “when you gain power, you do all you can to keep power – and often that requires violence”. This is something I have spoken about before in this blog – in the past in reference to political protest movements. As I argued:
In his book ‘Violence,’ philosopher Slavok Žižek argues that our society tends to focus on what he calls ‘subjective violence’ – acts of assault, murder, terror and war. In doing so, we ignore two other forms of violence in our society, ‘symbolic violence embodied in language and its forms,’ and systematic violence, which he states are the “often catastrophic consequences of the functioning of our economic and political systems.” These forms of violence are what are described as ‘structural violence,’ or the violence embedded in our society through the way it operates.
We can see Žižek’s theory in play when we discuss modern protest movements. We are very quick to condemn violence when it involves at the Seattle World Trade Organisation ‘riots,’ the riots in London or the Tent Embassy protest on Australia Day, without commenting on the ongoing systematic violence conducted by the World Trade Organisation, the British economy, or the 200 year oppression of Aboriginal people. We criticise queer protestors when they engage in violent acts, whilst ignoring the symbolic violence embedded in the homophobic language that still dominates our society today.
Violence therefore is not just hitting people or destroying someone’s property – it systematic in our society, and hurts those without power the most. In doing so therefore we must recognise that violence is subjective – what I view as violence (destroying the environment), others may view as ‘development’. What I may view as ‘the defence of the planet’ (obstructing coal developments), others may view as the destruction of private property and therefore ‘violence’. Importantly this means that, as there is no such thing as an action without consequences, anything (in particular for social movements) can be considered violent. Anything that has a negative impact on another can be considered violent.
And idea that violence is just ‘hurting others’ therefore can actually have a real negative effective – perpetuating the systems that inflict the most violence. If we don’t take symbolic and systematic violence into we end up with debates about whether a protester throwing rocks at the police was ‘too violent’, ignoring the very real systematic violence that that protester has likely face for their entire lives.
This then builds into a larger question of what are the boundaries? Given that violence is subjective and that we can frame almost any action, particularly one that aims to tear down societal systems, as violence – where are our limits.
I have to say I have no idea of the answer to this question, but I have to say I am not as fully convinced of the hardline ‘non-violence’ approach many like to take. I am not suggesting we engage in environmental terrorism to solve climate change, but rather that we need to have a serious and nuanced approach to violence – one that can take in the subjectivity inherent in the subject. We need to recognise that non-violent direct action, and civil disobedience, will, no matter what we do, be considered a form of violence by someone. And in doing so we need to find a way to come to peace with this.
It is in coming to piece with this that I would like to take some guidance from Saul Alinsky. I did a review of his piece Rules for Radicals for my friend Holly Hammond who runs Plan to Win a little while ago. Looking back on it, I found a section that I think is a valuable way to end this discussion (rather than me re-writing it all). Here goes:
“One of the most interesting areas in this discussion is his work on how radical organisations can justify means in order to achieve their ends. When discussing means and ends, Alinsky states:
“That perennial question, “Does the end justify the means?” is meaningless as it stands; the real and only question regarding the ethics of means and ends is, and always has been, “Does this particular end justify this particular mean?”
In other words, Alinsky argues that there are no clear lines for defining what ‘justifiable means’ are, but rather that justification is dependent on the context of the campaign and issue. This is particularly relevant given the power structures in our society, where those who are fighting for change (who are often the ones who get caught up in discussions about the ethics of means and ends) are fighting against people with a large amount of power who often have little care about the ethics of their means. Alinsky therefore states that:
“The practical revolutionary will understand Goethe’s “conscience is the virtue of observers and not of agents of action”; in action, one does not always enjoy the luxury of a decision that is consistent both with one’s individual conscience and the good of mankind (sic). The choice must always be for the latter.”
Alinsky develops this idea further by outlining a range of rules for how organisations can determine the ethics of their means and ends. Two key rules are:
“The third rule of the ethics of means and ends is that in war the end justifies almost any means.”
“The ninth rule of the ethics of means and ends is that any effective means is automatically judged by the opposition as being unethical.”
The discussion on means and ends is just one area where Alinsky challenges much of the dominant discourse around movements for change. Throughout his work, Alinsky argues that much of our strategic decisions about ethics are made out of context, and that this is not a practical way to achieve change. And this is what is so important about his work. In many ways Alinsky’s work is an analysis of flawed approaches to social change (even today) and a call out for change. The great thing is that he also provides realistic, radicals ways for this to be achieved.”
I’m certain I am going to have some more thoughts on violence as we get into this debate. But this is a good start.